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Abstract 
Administrative tribunals are adjudicating bodies 
established to relieve the traditional courts from the ever 
mounting pressure of litigation. This paper makes an 
analysis of the powers and functions of the administrative 
tribunals as laid down by the judiciary. A series of case 
laws are examined at length which debate the nature of 
the functions of the tribunals and also elucidate the 
importance of tribunals in dispensation of justice.  
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Introduction 
Administrative Tribunals have existed in a rudimentary form for 
quite some time. In 1958, in order to relieve the courts, from the 
burden of service litigation, the Law Commission recommended 
the establishment of tribunals consisting of judicial and 
administrative members to decide service matters.1 The Central 
Government appointed a committee under the chairmanship of 
Justice J.C. Shah of the Supreme Count of India in 1969, which also 
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1 Law Commission of India, XIV REPORT OF REFORM OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION (1958), available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/ 
1-50/Report14Vol1.pdf. 
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made similar recommendations.2 In 1975, Swaran Singh Committee 
again recommended the setting up of service tribunals.3 The idea of 
setting up of service tribunals is to save the courts from the 
avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters. This also 
found favour with the Supreme Court of India in K.K. Dutta v. 
Union of India.4 It was against this backdrop that the Parliament 
passed the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 which added 
Part XIV – A to the Constitution. Article 323-A enabled Parliament 
to constitute Administrative tribunals for dealing with certain 
matters like recruitment and conditions of service of persons 
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the 
affairs of union or of any state or of any local or other authority 
within the territory of India or under the control of the Government 
of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the 
government; while Article 323-B empowers the appropriate 
legislature i.e. both the Parliament and the State legislatures to 
establish tribunals for the adjudication or trial of any disputes, 
complaints or offences with respect to matters like levy, 
assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax, ceiling on urban 
property, elections to the Houses of central or state legislatures and 
any other matter. Parliament was further empowered to prescribe 
by law the jurisdiction, power, authority and procedure of such 
tribunals and also to exclude the jurisdiction of all the courts except 
that of the Supreme Court under Article 136.5 Considering these 
provisions of the Constitution, Parliament enacted Administrative 
Tribunals Act 1985 which came into effect on November 1, 1985 for 
the establishment of administrative tribunals for deciding service 
disputes of civil servants of the centre as well as of the states. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Law Commission of India, 215 REPORT L. CHANDRA KUMAR BE REVISITED 
BY LARGER BENCH OF SUPREME COURT SHAH COMMISSION REPORT (1977), 
available at http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report215.pdf. 
3 Id. 
4 A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2056. 
5 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 323-A (2) (d), 323-B (3) (d). 
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Service Tribunals 
The Central Administrative Tribunal is empowered to exercise all 
the jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately by 
all courts except the Supreme Court.6 The Act does not, however 
apply to the employees of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, any 
member of the Naval, Military or Air Force or any other Armed 
Forces of the Union, officers and servants of the Supreme Court 
and High Courts, Secretarial Staff of the House of People, Council 
of States and state legislative assemblies and councils.7 Central 
Industrial Security Force and Cantonment Board also do not fall 
under the jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal. 
In adjudicating disputes, the tribunals are not bound by the 
procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure8 but are 
guided by the principles of natural justice. The tribunals are vested 
with the same powers as of the civil courts under the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908.9 They may summon and enforce the attendance of 
any witness for examining under oath. They can receive evidence 
on affidavit and can examine the witnesses. The tribunals are 
empowered to review their own decisions and in all procedural 
matters including the fixing of places, time of inquiry. The tribunals 
in order to regulate their own procedure are required to conform to 
specific rules framed by the Central Government and to the 
principles of natural justice.10 
In relation to service matters, the jurisdiction, power and authority 
is vested with the Administrative Tribunals to the exclusion of 
various courts. Before the establishment of the Administrative 
Tribunal for service matters, the suits for enforcement of any civil 
right were entertained by the civil court.11 The jurisdiction of these 
courts is now barred by the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985.12 
Furthermore, there was a provision initially for the exclusion of all 
                                                          
6 See The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 12(1). 
7 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 §§ 1 (2) (b), 2. 
8 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 22. 
9 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 22 (3). 
10 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 35. 
11 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 § 9. 
12 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 29. 
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the courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the 
Constitution.13 This provision has been amended14 after the case of 
Sampath Kumar v. Union of India15 and the words ‘no court except’: 
a) The Supreme Court or; 
b) Any industrial tribunal, labour court or other authority 
constituted under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 or any 
other corresponding law for the time being in force,  
have been inserted. 
The jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 has 
also been barred by the provision of the enactment.16It cannot be 
said that civil servants don not possess the right of judicial review 
through the establishment of Administrative Tribunal by ousting 
the jurisdiction of the High Court. The change made is that the 
employees shall first go to Administrative Tribunal and thereafter 
to the Supreme Court. 
According to the Act, the tribunal is empowered to pronounce 
judgment in civil proceedings which would be final17 except in 
cases where an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution to the 
Supreme Court is preferred. 
Judicial Analysis of the Powers and Functions of the 
Administrative Tribunals 
Since the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 provides appeal by 
special leave to the Supreme Court, it is pertinent to explore the 
contours of Article 136.  Article 136 is a special provision and 
covers generally the cases, which do not fall under Articles 132 to 
134. This provision of the Constitution is not subjected to 
certification by the High Courts as a fit case of appeal. Therefore, it 
is a rare provision which can be swung into action to maintain the 
spirit of the Constitution and to prevent the miscarriage of justice. 
                                                          
13 The Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1986. 
14 The Administrative Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 1986 § 28. 
15 A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 386. 
16 A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188. 
17 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 30. 
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Article 136 confers discretion on the Supreme Court to grant special 
leave to appeal before itself, from only judgment, determination, 
sentence, order passed or made by any court or tribunal in any 
cause or matter. Indeed, the judgment of the courts and Tribunals 
can be appealed to the Supreme Court under the provisions of this 
Article. However, what is a tribunal, is a subject matter of debate. 
The meaning of the word tribunal as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court in various appeals filed under the Article 136 of the 
Constitution presents a vivid picture as to the meaning of the word 
tribunal. 
In Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank,18 the five judge bench 
while deciding the fate of appeal considered the question whether 
the Supreme Court could entertain an appeal under Article 136 
against an award of an industrial tribunal. The minority comprising 
Mukherjee J., expressed the view that the tribunal’s function was 
merely an extended form of the process of collective bargaining 
and was more akin to administrative rather than judicial functions. 
The Supreme Court could not grant special leave to appeal from an 
award of industrial tribunal, because of the minority judgment. 
Mahajan J., opined that the industrial tribunal has all the necessary 
attributes of a court of justice. It discharges no other function except 
that of adjudicating a dispute and such a tribunal could be 
characterized as a quasi-judicial body because it is outside the 
regular judicial hierarchy. Nevertheless, it discharges functions, 
which are basically judicial in nature. Accordingly, it was held that 
the Supreme Court could grant special leave to appeal under 
Article 136 against an award of an industrial tribunal. Kania, C.J. 
opined that even though the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to 
grant leave to appeal from a decision given by an industrial 
tribunal, the Supreme Court will be very reluctant to entertain the 
application for leave to appeal. The apex court further opined that 
the word ‘tribunal’ in the Article 136, meant a tribunal adorned 
with similar trappings as a court and performing functions which 
cannot but be regarded as judicial. 
                                                          
18 The Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 § 28. 
Sanjay Gupta and Smriti Sharma                                              ISSN 2278-4322 
88 
 
In J&K Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, 
Kanpur19, the question regarding whether the scope and authority of 
adjudicator and state industrial tribunal is similar to the powers of 
the civil court. The apex court stated howsoever wide their powers 
are, these tribunals are not absolute though they are not courts in 
the strict sense of the term. They have to discharge quasi judicial 
functions and as such are subject to the over-riding jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Under the 
Constitution, the ultimate authority is given to the higher courts to 
restrain all exercise of absolute and arbitrary powers, not only by 
the executive and by officials and lesser tribunals, but also by the 
legislatures and even by the Parliament itself. 
Further in Harinagar Sugar Mills v. Shyam Sunder,20 it was provided 
that the attributes of a court is the part of a tribunal set up by a 
state under its Constitution to exercise the judicial power of the 
state i.e., the power to decide controversies between its subjects or 
between itself and its subjects – to uphold rights and to punish 
wrongs. 
Moreover, a tribunal must be recognized by the law as a ‘court’, 
and mere exercise of functions in a judicial manner is not enough. It 
must exercise the power to decide by reason of the sanction of law 
and not by the voluntary submissions of the parties to its 
jurisdiction and like a court, must determine the controversy 
objectively and impartially. 
The ambit of the word ‘court’ is wider than ‘tribunal’. All courts are 
tribunals, but all tribunals are not courts. The expression tribunal 
means seat of judge, or a court of justice.21 The necessary attribute 
is that it can give a final judgment between two parties, which 
carries legal sanction by its own force. That the word ‘tribunal’ in 
juxtaposition to the word ‘court’ could only mean a tribunal which 
exercised judicial functions of the state and did not include within 
its ambit a tribunal which had quasi-judicial or administrative 
powers. It was finally said that by the use of word ‘tribunal’ in 
                                                          
19 A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 231. 
20 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1669. 
21 Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1954 
S.C. 520. 
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Article 136, the intention was to give the similar meaning as 
‘court’.22  
However in Durga Shanker’s Case,23 it was pointed out that the 
expression ‘tribunal’ as used in Article 136 of the Constitution does 
not mean the same thing as ‘court’ but includes within its ambit, all 
adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the state and 
are invested with judicial as distinguished from purely 
administrative or executive functions
24.
 
Further in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd.
25
 the 
apex court observed that for invoking Article 136 (1) two conditions 
must be satisfied: 
i. the act complained against must have the character of a 
judicial or quasi-judicial act as distinguished from a mere 
executive or administrative act; and 
ii. the authority whose act is complained against must be a 
court or a tribunal.  
Furthermore, the apex court distinguishing a ‘tribunal’ from a court 
stated that the expression ‘court’ in the technical sense is a tribunal 
constituted by the state as a part of ordinary hierarchy of courts, 
which are invested with state’s inherent judicial powers. A tribunal 
as distinguished from a court, exercises a judicial power and 
decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi-judicially, but 
does not constitute a court in the technical sense. The tribunal, 
according to the dictionary meaning, is a ‘seat of justice’; and in the 
discharge of its functions, it shares some of the characteristics of the 
court. The domestic tribunal appointed in the departmental 
proceedings as well as purely administrative tribunals are outside 
the scope of Article 136 (1). Tribunals which are contemplated by 
Article 136 (1), are clothed with some of the powers of the court. 
                                                          
22 Bharat Bank v. Employees of Bharat Bank A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 188. 
23 Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1954 
SC 520. 
24 Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520. 
25 A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 874; See Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmi 
Chand A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 677,Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit 
Singh A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1140. 
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They can compel the witnesses to appear; they can administer oath; 
they are required to follow certain rules and procedure; the 
proceedings before them are required to comply with rules of 
natural justice; they are not be bound by the strict and technical 
rules of evidence but nevertheless they must decide on evidence 
adduced before them; they must not be bound by the other 
technical rules of law, but their decisions must nevertheless be 
consistent with the general principles of law. The procedural rules 
which regulate the proceedings before the tribunal and the powers 
conferred on them in dealing with matters brought before them are 
sometimes described as ‘trapping of a court’. The basic and 
essential condition that makes an authority or a body, a tribunal 
under Article 136 is that it should be constituted by the state and 
should be invested with the state’s inherent judicial power. 
In Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh,26the apex court opined 
that the expression ‘tribunal’ includes within its ambit, all 
adjudicating bodies, provided they are constituted by the state and 
are invested with judicial functions. The powers given by Article 
136 of the Constitution are in the nature of special or residuary 
powers and vests in the Supreme Court a plenary jurisdiction in the 
matter of entertaining appeals, by granting of special leave against 
any kind of judgment or order made by a court or tribunal. 
Moreover, the apex court has also observed that its scope and 
power under Article 136 of the Constitution vis-à-vis awards of 
tribunals is not that of a regular court of appeal against orders of 
tribunals. Article 136 confers a discretionary power on the Supreme 
Court to grant Special leave to appeal from the order of any 
tribunal in the territory of India.27 
Moreover, the Supreme Court expects the tribunals to record 
speaking order even while summarily dismissing the appeals. The 
condition of giving reason is only attached to an order made by the 
government when it functions judicially as a tribunal in a 
                                                          
26 See Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 
West Bengal A.I.R 1955 S.C. 65;   
    M/s Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Their 
Employees A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 633. 
27 Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. v. Workmen A.I.R. 1567 S.C. 948. 
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comparatively small number of matters and not in regard to other 
administrative orders it passes. The condition to give reason 
introduces clarity and exclude or at any rate minimizes 
arbitrariness.28 
Further, it was opined that the principles of natural justice requires 
a quasi-judicial tribunal not make a decision adverse to a party 
without giving him an effective opportunity of meeting any 
relevant allegation made against him but that depends on the facts 
of each case and it is in the discretion of the tribunal.29 
In reference to appeals from tax tribunals, it is observed that save in 
exceptional and special circumstances, the Supreme Court would 
not exercise its power under Article 136 in such a way as to bypass 
the High Court by entertaining an appeal direct from the order of 
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and thereby ignore the decision 
given by the High Court.30 
In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India,31 the apex court opined that 
the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the 
High Court under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under 
Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of 
the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Further, it 
was opined that the tribunals are competent to hear matters where 
the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in 
discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High 
Courts and the Supreme Court, which have, under the 
constitutional set up, been specifically entrusted with such an 
obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and 
all such decisions of the tribunal will be subject to scrutiny before a 
division bench of the respective High Court. The tribunals will 
consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate 
legislations and rules. However, the power of the tribunals shall be 
subjected to an exception that they shall not entertain any question 
regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled 
                                                          
28 Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671. 
29 Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671. 
30 Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Lakhiram Ramdas A.I.R. 1967 
S.C. 338. 
31 A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125. 
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principle that a tribunal which is a creation of a legislation cannot 
declare the same to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the 
concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other 
decisions of the tribunals will also be subject to scrutiny before a 
Division Bench of their respective High Court.  
Thus, through this case, the apex court tried to save the jurisdiction 
of constitutional courts from encroachment by legislature by 
invoking the doctrine of ‘basic features of the Constitution'. 
By comparing L. Chandra’s Case32 with Sampat Kumar's Case33, the 
Supreme Court held that Sampat Kumar's Case was decided against 
the background, that the litigation before the High Courts had 
increased in an unprecedented manner and therefore, alternative 
inquisitional mechanism was necessary to remedy the situation. 
But it is self evident and a widely acknowledged truth that the 
tribunals have not performed well, hence drastic measures are 
necessary in order to elevate their standard by ensuring that they 
stand up to constitutional scrutiny. Further, the court held that 
because the constitutional safeguards which ensure the 
independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts are not available to the members of the tribunals, hence they 
cannot be considered full and effective substitute for the superior 
judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional 
interpretation. Against this backdrop, the court came to the 
conclusion that Administrative Tribunals cannot perform a 
substitutional role to the High Court, it can only be supplemental. 
Further the Supreme Court in State of T.N. v. S. Thangavel,34 held 
that members of the tribunal are not judges and their order is not a 
judgment or decree under Section 2 (9) of the Civil Procedure Code 
1908. At best their statements can be construed to be only orders for 
the purpose of decision arrived at by the tribunal under the 
Administrative Tribunal Act 1985. 
Even though the judgment in the above cases does not ipso facto 
apply to the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, but the ratio of 
the case applies to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Jammu and 
                                                          
32 A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 1125. 
33 A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 386. 
34 (1997) 2 SCC 349. 
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Kashmir High Court. Thus, in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. Subash 
Sharma,35 it was held that the central government employees 
working in the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot by pass the 
jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It has an 
exclusive jurisdiction, as a court of first instance, in relation to 
service matters concerning employees of the Kendriya Vidyalaya 
posted in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. 
Administrative Tribunal and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
The ‘doctrine of precedent’ applies to the Administrative Tribunals 
as well. The court held that whenever an application under Section 
19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 is filed which involves a 
question already concluded by an earlier decision, the tribunal 
must take into account that decision as a precedent and decide 
accordingly. If the tribunal dissents then the matter must be 
referred to a larger bench.36 
Conclusion 
The basic purpose behind the establishment of administrative 
tribunals is to provide expeditious justice to the civil servants, 
which is not available under the traditional system. The apex court 
has maintained that before availing the appellate powers under 
Article 136, the person must exhaust the statutory remedies 
available to him. Even this is a self imposed regulation of the apex 
court in order to check the multiplicity of the proceedings before 
the apex court. The above stance can be relaxed by the Supreme 
Court if special circumstances justified as is highlighted in Chandi 
Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar.37 
It can thus be seen that the apex court can not only entertain the 
cases from the regular courts, but also the cases determined by all 
adjudicating bodies invested with judicial functions. It does not 
matter that the statute empowering such adjudicating bodies with 
power of adjudication does not provide for further appeals and 
                                                          
35 (2002) 4 S.C.C. 145. 
36 K. Ajit Babu v. Union of India (1997) 6 S.C.C. 473. 
37 A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1708. 
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confers conclusive finality to the decisions of the tribunals.38 The 
special leave to appeal can be granted by the apex court if the 
adjudicating bodies including tribunals do not observe the 
principles of natural justice especially in cases where no reason for 
decision has been provided by the adjudicating authorities. 
Moreover, appeal by special leave shall be allowed by the Supreme 
Court only in cases where there is likelihood of substantial and 
grave injustice. 
Thus, Administrative Tribunals will go a long way as a 
supplementary dispute resolution mechanism and help in 
minimizing the number of cases pending before the court. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 520. 
